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ratory judgment in Jersey Central suggests it faced such a dilemma.
A court that refuses to limit its perception of employment dis-
crimination by unqualifiedly accepting an employment or plant-
wide system as bona fide raises the spectre of preferential treat-
ment. Minority protection and affirmative actions as expressed in
Title VII were designed to facilitate the development of an inte-
grated, equally protected workforce. Until the Supreme Court pre-
scribes the limits of these minority safeguards, the scope of the
commitment to root out effects of past discrimination to accomplish
this end will remain unclear.
Phoebe Haddon Northcross
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PRO-
CESS-STATE PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT STATUTE-The Supreme
Court of the United States has held the due process requirements
of the United States Constitution were not satisfied by a state stat-
ute which permitted issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment
on the basis of conclusory allegations made in an ex parte proceed-
ing without judicial participation and which afforded the alleged
debtor's interest in the property no protection other than provisions
for posting bond and counterbond.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975).
Respondent Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit in the Superior Court of
Whitfield County, Georgia, alleging an indebtedness due for goods
sold and delivered to petitioner. The same day, respondent filed a
shutting down plants on certain days. Where layoffs represented the only feasible option, the
guidelines suggested employers seek volunteers to take temporary leave on a rotating basis.
88 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 216-17 (1975). Further reports, however, indicated the EEOC had
postponed its decision to issue guideline§ until they were evaluated by other federal civil
rights enforcement agencies. Id. at 253. In April, 1975, commissioners of the EEOC voted to
defer action on the proposed guidelines since, according to EEOC sources, other agencies had
opposed the EEOC approach. Id. at 313.
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bond' and affidavit2 with the clerk of court, stating the amount of
the debt and apprehension of loss of the amount unless garnishment
proceedings were begun. ' Before service of respondent's complaint,
summons of the garnishment was served on the garnishee. The pro-
cedure froze a substantial bank account used to meet the peti-
tioner's payroll and other obligations before the petitioner had
knowledge of the filed claim for indebtedness. The petitioner subse-
quently filed bond' in court to dissolve the garnishment5 and moved
to dismiss the writ on the basis that the statute, which did not
provide notice and a prior opportunity to be heard, violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. When the motion was denied, petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court of Georgia.' This court rejected petitioner's
claim that the case presented issues similar to those in the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
1. Bond was filed pursuant to a statutory provision which authorized any joint creditor
to make an affidavit and give bond in the name of the plaintiff whenever garnishment was
sought to recover a debt owed a partnership or firm. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-104 (1974). The
plaintiff was required to give bond in an amount at least double the sum sworn due. The sum
was payable to the defendant if the plaintiff failed to recover in the suit, the money or
property sought to be garnished was not subject to garnishment or the stated amount was
not actually due. Id. § 46-102.
2. The affidavit named as garnishee The First National Bank of Dalton, with which the
petitioner had deposited a bank account in the sum of $51,279.17. The affidavit alleged only
that the petitioner owed respondent the above amount, which respondent had reason to
believe would be lost unless the garnishment issued. The affidavit is reproduced in full in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 604 n.2 (1975). The statute
allowed the plaintiff's agent or attorney to execute the affidavit. The agent's personal knowl-
edge of the facts was not required. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1974).
3. The Georgia statute made the process of garnishment available whenever suit was
pending or judgment was obtained. Wages were exempt until after final judgment. GA. CODE
ANN. § 46-101 (1974).
4. The statute permitted the defendant to dissolve the garnishment by filing a bond with
good security. If the plaintiff prevailed in the primary suit, judgment could be entered upon
the bond and security. Id. § 46-401.
5. The bond was also filed to attain standing; until bond was made, Georgia courts viewed
the action as between the plaintiff-garnishor and the garnishee, and would not hear an attack
by the defendant. Brief for Petitioner at 11, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
6. The Georgia Supreme Court originally transferred the case to the Georgia Court of
Appeals, which ruled the record on appeal was insufficient because it did not show what
statute had been challenged, which specific constitutional provisions were involved, and
whether the trial court had ruled the statute constitutional, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 593, 194 S.E.2d 508 (1972). The Georgia Supreme Court, con-
cluding the court of appeals had erred, granted certiorari so the constitutional issues could
be heard. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 284 (1973).
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Corp.,' on grounds that Sniadach represented an exception, limited
to wages, to the general rule upholding garnishment statutes. The
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was affirmed.' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
The Supreme Court reversed,10 noting the Georgia court had dis-
regarded the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin," which invalidated state ex parte replevin procedures.
Fuentes was not, as the respondent contended, inapposite because
the two corporations in the instant case bargained from equal posi-
tions; 2 regardless of relative bargaining strengths, a party was enti-
tled to some type of due process protection whenever it was deprived
of a significant property interest. 3 Respondent also claimed the
statutory requirement that the affiant file a bond" sufficiently pro-
tected the alleged debtor from a wrongful determination as to
whether the writ should issue.' Examining the procedure utilized
by the state to guard against wrongful issuance of the writ, the
Court compared the Georgia statute to the statutory scheme in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. " and concluded the Georgia statute had
none of the "saving characteristics" of the latter.' The statute in
the instant case provided for issuance of the writ without judicial
7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See text at notes 39-43 infra.
8. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321 (1973).
Approximately three months later, a federal court found the same Georgia statute violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp.
639 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
9. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc,, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
10. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 605-06 (1975).
11. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See text at notes 44-47 infra.
12. Brief for Respondent at 8, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975). The respondent distinguished Sniadach and Fuentes because they involved adhe-
sion contracts. The respondent further contended a corporation's bank account was of a
character needing less protection than wages or household goods. See generally Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (contractual waiver of due process rights between parties of equal
bargaining power in an arm's length agreement); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S.
174 (1972).
13. Although individuals deprived of necessities were more likely to suffer irreparably
than corporations deprived of bank accounts, the Court considered the probability of irrepar-
able injury to a corporation sufficient to require some procedures to decrease the initial risk
of error. The likely severity of the deprivation was a factor in determining the form of, but
not the right to, due process protection. 419 U.S. at 608.
14. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974).
15. Brief for Respondent at 11.
16. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See text at notes 48-61 infra.
17. 419 U.S. at 607.
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participation upon an affidavit containing only conclusory allega-
tions' by the creditor or his agent, whose personal knowledge of the
facts was not required. 9 Further, the statute afforded the defendant
no prompt post-writ hearing at which the writ could be dissolved
upon a factual showing. In contrast, the Mitchell statute provided
for issuance of a writ by a judge only after the creditor had made
allegations beyond mere conclusions; the alleged debtor could have
the writ dissolved at a post-writ hearing. The Court concluded that
the Georgia procedure, which deprived the defendant of the use of
its property before the main suit was resolved on the merits, violated
the due process clause.10
Justice Stewart concurred and expressed his gratification with the
result, which he construed as a revival of Fuentes.' In a separate
concurrence, Justice Powell felt the majority relied too heavily upon
Fuentes, which in his mind had been significantly narrowed by
Mitchell.22 He felt the most compelling deficiency of the Georgia
statute was its failure to provide an early post-writ hearing. The
debtor had no opportunity to challenge the garnishment until he
had assumed the additional burden of filing a bond. In Justice Pow-
ell's view, procedural due process would be satisfied if a statute
required that the garnishor provide adequate security after estab-
lishing factually" before a neutral officerA that garnishment was
18. See note 2 supra.
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1974).
20. 419 U.S. at 607. Under the statute, the alleged debtor could dissolve the writ only by
filing his own bond. The Court noted another unattractive feature of the procedure: appar-
ently, the defendant had no standing to challenge the garnishment action on any grounds
until he filed a bond. Id.
21. Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell believed Fuentes failed to strike a
proper balance between the respective interests of the creditor and debtor. In his view,
Mitchell had severely limited the scope of Fuentes. He feared its apparent resuscitation in
Di-Chem would have an unsettling effect on the law controlling commercial transactions. See
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. This requirement need not be elaborate. Where, as in Georgia, garnishment is avail-
able to the creditor only if suit is pending or judgment has been obtained, the issuing officer
need not inquire further into the allegation of the existence of a debt. The creditor's apprehen-
sion of eventual inability to collect the debt would be sufficient to justify the garnishment
until the post-writ hearing if the affidavit averred that no assets less transitory than a
nonresident's bank account were available in the state to satisfy a prospective judgment. 419
U.S. at 612-13 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
24. Justice Powell did not feel the due process clause required that a judicial officer issue
the writ. In light of other procedural safeguards, a clerk or other court officer could issue the
writ upon the filing of the proper affidavit. Id. at 611 n.3.
1976
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necessary to preserve the garnishor's interest in the property; the
procedure should include a prompt post-writ hearing at which the
debtor could demonstrate that the garnishment was unfounded.
In a six-point dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist25 and in part by
Chief Justice Burger," Justice Blackmun argued that Fuentes was
inadequate authority because it was not decided by a full court,"
and improper precedent in view of Mitchell.2 He would have limited
Sniadach to situations involving garnishment of wages. He felt the
Georgia statute afforded adequate protection to a corporation,
which could easily cope with garnishment in its ordinary daily com-
mercial transactions. 9 Finally, the dissent objected that the Court
had cast into doubt the constitutionality of corresponding state gar-
nishment statutes. This uncertainty could only be dispelled through
a long, unrewarding case-by-case analysis which Justice Blackmun
predicted would favor Fuentes and minimize Mitchell.3
Traditionally, the due process clause has been construed as re-
quiring notice and an opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful time
25. Id. at 614 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
26. Chief Justice Burger joined in paragraph five of Justice Blackmun's dissent, which
stated that Sniadach was inapplicable because the petitioner was not a wage earner but a
commercial entity already afforded all the protection required by due process. Id. at 620
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Although Justices Powell and Rehnquist had joined the Court by the time Fuentes
was decided, they did not participate because they had not been members when the case was
argued. Justice Blackmun felt the case should have been reargued before a full Court. In his
view, a constitutional question should not be decided by less than the whole Court except
when absolutely necessary. He felt adherence to this principle could have averted the confu-
sion in commercial communities certain to result from the Court's decisions in Fuentes,
Mitchell and Di-Chem. Id. at 616-19. See Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
118, 122 (1834) (Court deferred the decision of a constitutional question until the following
term, when it was more likely a majority of the whole Court would concur).
28. 419 U.S. at 615-16. Justice Blackmun cited the dissenting and concurring opinions in
Mitchell: Justice Stewart wrote in his dissent that the Court had unmistakably overruled
Fuentes, which he had authored. 416 U.S. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Justice Brennan
felt Fuentes required a result opposite to that reached by the majority in Mitchell. Id. at 636
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Justice Powell thought it fair to say that Fuentes had been over-
ruled by Mitchell. Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 61 infra.
29. 419 U.S. at 614-15.
30. Under the Georgia statute, the writ was obtainable only after the main suit had been
filed and the creditor had posted double bond. The debtor could free his garnished property
by filing his own bond, but his only opportunity for a full hearing occurred at the trial of the
primary suit. Although these provisions differed from those in Mitchell, Justice Blackmun
presumably thought the Georgia statute would withstand the analysis used by the Court in
Mitchell. He accused the majority of arbitrarily resurrecting Fuentes without convincingly
distinguishing Mitchell. Id. at 619-20.
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in a meaningful manner" when one was deprived of a significant
property interest.' The form of the proceeding was not prescribed; 32
but was determined by balancing the conflicting interests of the
parties. : Where property rights alone were concerned and it was
essential that state needs be satisfied immediately, postponement
of notice and hearing until after the taking was not considered a
denial of due process.34 Thus in a number of cases involving the
emergency exercise of the state's police power, the Supreme Court
held that notice and a hearing were not necessary prior to govern-
ment seizure of private property.35 The states reserved the authority
to protect creditors with provisional remedies in actions of replevin,
attachment and garnishment, and until recently the Supreme Court
was reluctant to disturb this exercise of state power .3  State courts
sustained summary procedures on the grounds that the deprivations
31. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (a natural parent must be
given an opportunity to be heard before his silence may be interpreted as a waiver of the
statutory requirement that he consent to his child's adoption).
32. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972) ("the very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation");
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (in considering what procedures due
process may require under given circumstances, a court must determine the precise nature
of the governmental function involved and the private interest affected).
33. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (trustee to notify
by mail beneficiaries whose addresses were readily accessible, but notice by publication was
sufficient for those whose addresses would be difficult to obtain).
34. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (notice and hearing postponed
to insure prompt collection of internal revenue).
35. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (to protect the
health and welfare of the public); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (to protect the
public from the economic consequences of a bank failure); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239
(1921) (to meet the needs of a national war effort).
36. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922) (long practiced state creditor remedies
not easily affected by the fourteenth amendment); Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334 (1902)
(state courts and legislatures should determine attachment procedures).
In three cases challenging summary state procedures on due process grounds, the Supreme
Court upheld the statutes. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (affirmed per curiam a
state court holding that temporary deprivations of property were not the deprivations con-
templated by the Constitution); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (allowed
the execution of liens without prior notice or hearing on the property of stockholders of
insolvent banks who had failed to pay assessments on the par value of their stock); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (permitted attachment of property before notice or hearing
when necessary to secure jurisdiction in a state court).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 14: 494
caused were not of the kind"? or quality " protected by the due pro-
cess clause.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,3" the Supreme Court held
that a state statute permitting prejudgment garnishment of wages
without prior notice and hearing violated the due process clause.
The procedure, which deprived the employee of wages from the
issuance of the writ until the resolution of the main suit, was defi-
cient due to the great burden it imposed upon the wage earner."
Sniadach stressed the nature of the property seized and the hard-
ship to the defendant; among lower courts there were diverse inter-
pretations as to the scope of the decision. Some courts restricted
Sniadach to wages. 4 Others held a prior hearing was mandatory
only when the deprivation would cause undue hardship to the defen-
dant.42 A third approach required a hearing before a taking of any
significant property interest.43
37. E.g., Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932) (summary deprivation of
only the use and possession of property technically not a deprivation of pioperty requiring
prior notice or hearing).
38. E.g., Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd mem., 279 U.S. 820
(1929) (the conditional and temporary deprivation effected by such procedures was not the
deprivation of property contemplated by the fourteenth amendment).
39. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
40. Id. at 341-42. Language in the opinion indicated the holding applied only to wages,
which present "distinct problems in our economic system." Id. at 340.
41. E.g., American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 1970) (Sniadach
did not require prior notice or hearing unless wages were garnished or business property
attached); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (limited Sniadach to wages
in upholding the Pennsylvania replevin statute); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp.
1011, 1015-16 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (found no constitutional objection to Georgia's statutory gar-
nishment scheme as applied against property other than wages); Black Watch Farms, Inc.
v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971) (due process satisfied by the subsequent
plenary hearing in the main action when real property was attached); American Olean Tile
Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D. Hawaii 1970) (state statute which allowed
garnishment of a corporate bank account without prior notice or hearing was not contra
Sniadach, which applied only to wages).
42. E.g., Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103, 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (must
be notice and hearing before one is deprived of basic household furniture); Aaron v. Clark,
342 F. Supp. 898, 900 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (college tuition in a bank account was "specialized
property" within the meaning of Sniadach); Jones Press, Inc., v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc.,
286 Minn. 205, 210, 176 N.W.2d 87, 91 (19'f0) (for a self-employed person, accounts receivable
were sufficiently similar to wages that notice and hearing were necessary before garnishment).
43. E.g., Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (invalidated a state statute
which permitted imposition of an innkeeper's lien on a boarder's property without providing
a prior hearing); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969) (whether
there has been a due process violation should not depend on the type of property subject to
seizure).
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The Court appeared to clear the post-Sniadach confusion in
Fuentes v. Shevin.44 In Fuentes, the Court invalidated Florida and
Pennsylvania laws permitting replevin upon ex parte application to
a court clerk and filing of bond for double the value of the property
to be seized. The defendant could regain possession of the property
by posting his own security bond for double the value within three
days of the execution of the writ; if he did not, the property was
transferred to the party seeking the writ.45 Under neither state law
could the defendant challenge the issuance of the writ.4" The Court
denounced both state procedures for failing to balance the compet-
ing interests of the parties and announced the broad rule that, ex-
cept in extraordinary situations, a defendant must have notice and
a prior opportunity for a hearing before he may be deprived of any
significant property interest by state action.47
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.48 the Court faced a factual situa-
tion arguably controlled by Fuentes. In Mitchell, respondent filed
suit against the petitioner alleging an overdue unpaid balance on a
44. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
45. In the three day interim, the property was held under the supervision of the court.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.13 (Supp. 1976); PA. R. Civ. P. 1076(a), 1077(b).
46. The Florida appellant had purchased a stereo and stove for approximately six hundred
dollars, including financing, under an installment sales contract. The vendor retained title
to the merchandise, but the vendee was entitled to possession unless he defaulted in the
installment payments. The appellant met his payments for over a year; a dispute arose over
the servicing of the stove when the due balance was only two hundred dollars. The vendor
instituted an action for repossession, claiming appellant had refused to make the remaining
payments. Simultaneously, the vendor applied for and obtained a writ of replevin under
which the sheriff seized the property before appellant had notice of the complaint. The
Florida statute provided no hearing until the trial of the main action for repossession. 407
U.S. at 70-71.
The Pennsylvania rule did not grant a hearing at any time, since the party seeking the writ
was not obliged to initiate an action for repossession. The writ would issue solely on an
affidavit stating the value of the property to be replevied. The party from whom the property
was taken could obtain a post-seizure hearing by initiating a lawsuit. Three of the four
appellants challenging the Pennsylvania law bought personal property under installment
sales contracts and were dispossessed of the goods when the vendors, claiming appellants had
defaulted, obtained and executed writs of replevin. The other appellant was divorced from a
local deputy sheriff, with whom she was in dispute over the custody of their son. The husband
obtained a writ ordering seizure of the son's clothing, furniture and toys. Id. at 71-72.
47. While the length and severity of the deprivation was a factor weighed in determining
the appropriate form of hearing, it was not decisive of the right to a prior hearing. Id. at 86.
Fuentes allowed postponement of the required notice and hearing under three conditions. The
deprivation must be directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest, prompt action must be imperative, and the state must strictly control its exercise
of legitimate force. The Court emphasized that such situations are truly unusual. Id. at 90-
92 & nn.23-28.
48. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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sale of goods." At the same time, the respondent claimed a vendor's
lien in the property and obtained a writ of sequestration. The stat-
ute provided for issuance of the writ by a judge 0 on adequate secu-
rity5 and an affidavit establishing more than conclusory allega-
tions, ',' followed by a prompt post-writ hearing at which the debtor
could dissolve the writ upon a factual showing.53 The Louisiana
statute might have violated due process as delineated in Fuentes by
failing to provide notice and a prior opportunity to be heard. The
Court effectively narrowed the scope of Fuentes, however, by hold-
ing that Mitchell was a case where alternative procedural safe-
guards which satisfied due process requirements had been built into
the statute. The Court's decision was based upon a recognition and
balancing of the concurrent interests of buyer and seller in the prop-
erty.Y1 Aside from the sequestration statute, the seller had no protec-
tion against the steady erosion of his security interest while the
property remained in the buyer's possession.55 Conversely, the seller
would compensate the buyer in the event he was wrongfully de-
prived of possession .5 The Court distinguished Fuentes as involving
49. The sale involved a refrigerator, range, stereo and washing machine; the amount
claimed due was $574.17. Id. at 601.
50. In the Parish of Orleans, where the events in Mitchell took place, judicial authoriza-
tion for issuance of a writ of sequestration was necessary. In the other parishes of Louisiana
the writ could be issued by a clerk of court. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 281 (West 1961). A
writ of sequestration was available where the applicant claimed ownership of, right to posses-
sion of, or a lien on property, and the defendant had the power to waste, alien or remove the
property from the parish daring the pendency of the action. Id. art. 3571.
51. The applicant was required to furnish security in an amount the court determined was
sufficient to protect the defendant against any damage resulting from a wrongful issuance,
unless security was dispensed with by law. Id. art. 3574. The defendant could obtain the
release of the property seized under the writ by furnishing security to satisfy any judgment
which might be rendered against him. Id. art. 3507.
52. The writ would issue only when the amount and nature of the claim and the grounds
for issuance clearly appeared from specific facts shown by a petition verified by the petitioner
or his agent. Id. art. 3501.
53. The writ would be dissolved upon a motion by the defendant unless the plaintiff
proved the grounds upon which the writ issued. The court was authorized to allow damages
and attorney's fees in case of a wrongful issuance. Id. art. 3506.
54. In the Court's view, the seller's interest extended to the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase price while the buyer's interest was limited to the surplus after foreclosure and sale of
the property. 416 U.S. at 604.
55. The Court explained that normally the buyer's installment payments protect the
seller from the deterioration of his security interest by reducing the seller's interest with each
installment payment. Once the payments cease, the seller loses this protection. Id. at 608.
56. The Court emphasized that notice of the sequestration would give the buyer the
opportunity to waste or alien the property, thus making the seller's interest even more
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issues which could be resolved only at an adversary hearing; 7 the
issues in Mitchell could be properly determined at an ex parte hear-
ing." By reducing the likelihood, of a wrongful determination 9 and
minimizing the risk the buyer would suffer a severe deprivation,",
the statutory procedure offered a constitutional accommodation of
the conflicting interests of the buyer and seller."
Mitchell seemed to narrow the scope of Fuentes, although it was
not clear to what extent.2 The question remained whether alterna-
tive statutory procedures of the type in Mitchell which were upheld
tenuous. In Louisiana a vendor's lien is extinguished if the buyer aliens the property. LA.
Civ. PRo. ANN. arts. 3217(7), 3227 (West 1961); 416 U.S. at 609.
57. The Mitchell Court took the view that the issue of wrongful detention, which was
determined according to a fault standard, required an adversary hearing. 416 U.S. at 617. In
his dissent, ,Justice Stewart persuasively argued that the issues involved in replevin and
sequestration actions were identical. Id. at 633.
58. The Court felt the issues at this stage of the proceeding could be narrowed to the
determination of the existence of a debt, a lien and a delinquency. Id. at 607, cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1049 (1975). See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (where a tenant fails to pay
rent the litigable issues may be limited to whether there was payment; other defenses or
counterclaims may be segregated from the action for possession); Bianchi v. Morales, 262
U.S. 170 (1923) (under a statute the defenses to a summary mortgage foreclosure may be
limited to payment); Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915) (all claims of
ultimate right may be eliminated from a possessory action).
59. The Court considered judicial supervision over the procedure an additional safeguard
for the buyer. 416 U.S. at 619.
60. The opportunity for a prompt post-garnishment hearing shortened the length of the
deprivation. Id. at 618.
61. Id. at 607. Justice Powell concurred in the decision; he believed Mitchell overruled
the Fuentes principle, which was too broad and inflexible. Id. at 623. In the primary dissent,
Justice Stewart noted the Louisiana affidavit form offered the defendant no real protection,
because it could be filed by anyone. Whether the issuing functionary was a judge or a clerk,
he could do no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the affidavit; the issues in the
sequestration proceeding no more lent themselves to documentary proof than the issues in a
replevin action. According to Fuentes, the additional procedural safeguards in the Louisiana
statute were relevant in determining the form of the required hearing, but they did not
obviate the constitutional necessity for a prior hearing of some sort. This requirement should
not be qualified by the creditor's ability to show in advance that he would surely prevail in
the primary suit. Justice Stewart felt that since Fuentes and Mitchell were constitutionally
indistinguishable, Fuentes had been overruled. He believed the result in Mitchell reflected a
change in the composition of the Court rather than a valid distinction from Fuentes. Id. at
635 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed that Fuentes required an opposite result
in Mitchell. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Peacock v. Board of Regents, 510 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1049 (1975) (interpreted Mitchell as indicating the traditional balancing test is to be applied
without a presumption that a prior hearing is required); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d
607 (6th Cir. 1974) (assumed Fuentes had been overruled by Mitchell); Guzman v. Western
State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974), vacated, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975) (relied
on Mitchell to uphold a state procedure allowing attachment of personal property without
prior notice or hearing).
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by balancing the conflicting interests in the property would be
tested the same way where the creditor had no coexisting security
interest. Mitchell could be viewed as merely an exception to the
Fuentes rule for cases in which both creditor and debtor had a
present identifiable interest in the property.6 3 It might also herald
a return to the traditional balancing approach. Similarly, Di-Chem
could be interpreted two ways, each with a corresponding effect
upon the meaning of Mitchell. Di-Chem could indicate the Fuentes
rule is still effective and Mitchell an exception; 4 or that Mitchell
established a new standard setting the minimum level which satis-
fies due process.15
Despite its apparent reliance on Fuentes, Di-Chem clearly aban-
doned the absolutist position that a defendant, except in extraordi-
nary situations, must have a prior opportunity for a hearing before
he may be deprived of a significant property interest by state action.
The provisions of the Georgia statute were judged against those of
the sequestration statute in Mitchell; the due process requirements
articulated in Fuentes were not applied. The Court made a limited
return to balancing with respect to the timing of the proceedings:
its reliance on Mitchell implicitly acknowledged the respective
rights of the parties. Moreover, the Court treated the procedures in
Mitchell as the minimum required to satisfy due process. This ap-
proach is a compromise between the great flexibility of the tradi-
tional balancing analysis and the rigid protection debtors received
under the Fuentes prior notice and hearing requirement. The en-
hancement of Mitchell and demise of Fuentes are illustrated by the
the Di-Chem Court's complete disregard of the respondent's
Fuentes-oriented argument, by the use of Fuentes to determine only
whether the due process clause applied, and by the Court's incorpo-
ration of the Mitchell holding into its interpretation of what Fuentes
required in the way of due process.
63. It has been suggested that Mitchell and Fuentes could be entirely consistent if the
facts of Mitchell were considered within the "extraordinary situations" exception of Fuentes.
A majority of the Court, however, believed that Mitchell overruled Fuentes. Newton & Tim-
mons, Fuentes "Repossessed, " 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 469, 493-94 (1974).
64. Cf. 419 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. There is a practical need for clarification of the correct interpretation. See Doran v.
Home Mart Bldg. Centers, Inc., 233 Ga. 705, -, 213 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1975) (Gunter, J.,
concurring) (expressing uncertainty in light of Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem as
to whether a preseizure hearing is constitutionally required).
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In Di-Chem, the respondent contended an extraordinary situation
existed, since the petitioner could remove the property upon prior
notice of the garnishment and thereby frustrate the respondent's
interest in collecting its debt."6 Had the Court wished to fully revive
Fuentes, the case could have been concluded at this stage of the
argument; Fuentes clearly established that a creditor's interest in
collecting his debt and the possibility that the debtor would remove
his property if provided notice did not fall within the exception
allowing postponement of notice and a hearing."7 Rather than ad-
dressing the respondent's argument, however, the Court focused on
the procedure by which the state controlled the taking and timed
the hearing. This approach was consistent with Mitchell. Under this
analysis the Court might allow postponement of notice and hearing
until after the taking if, under adequate state supervision, the credi-
tor shows a debt, default, and that notice may defeat the remedy. 8
This result seems inevitable, since the Court "misquoted" the
Fuentes rule by incorporating the Mitchell standard:
Because the official seizures had been carried out without no-
tice and without an opportunity for a hearing or other
safeguard against mistaken repossession, they were held to be
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Addition of the phrase "or other safeguard" removed prior notice
and hearing from its position as exclusive due process protection
and made available the alternative Mitchell approach. 0
Nor does it seem the Court has limited Mitchell to situations in
which the creditor has an existing security interest in the property
66. Brief for Respondent at 9.
67. 407 U.S. at 92-93 n.29 (statutes which allow summary seizure of a person's possessions
merely to advance a private gain or reduce the costs of a private party serve no important
governmental or general public interest justifying postponement of notice and hearing).
Fuentes required the creditor show a special need for prompt action because of immediate
danger in the particular case that the debt would not be satisfied unless notice and hearing
were postponed. If the creditor could meet these criteria because alienation of the property
by the vendee would destroy the vendor's lien, the Fuentes "extraordinary situations" re-
quirement would be obliterated. 416 U.S. at 629 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. While such a showing should not be difficult, it may not be possible in every case.
See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (affording notice and hearing
to a mortgagor prior to foreclosure on real property would result in no prejudice to the
mortgagee since there was no need for prompt action).
69. 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
70. Under Fuentes, less effective alternative safeguards could affect the type of hearing
required but did not obviate the necessity of a prior hearing, which was viewed as "the only
truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property." 407 U.S. at 83-84.
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subject to summary seizure. In distinguishing Mitchell and Di-
Chem, the Court did not acknowledge the different character of the
individual interests involved in each case. The difference was only
noted peripherally when the Court cited Fuentes as authority that
the type of property or length of deprivation was irrelevant in deter-
mining the right to due process.7 The Court found the Georgia
statute deficient for its failure to reduce the possibility of an initial
wrongful determination or to minimize the hardship of such a deter-
mination to the defendant. Had the Georgia statute provided proce-
dural safeguards similar to those in the Louisiana statute, it would
likely have been upheld. Although the Court has enlarged the scope
of Mitchell, it has not returned to the traditional balancing ap-
proach. In Di-Chem, the Court has suggested the alternative proce-
dural safeguards ratified in Mitchell are a minimum standard
designed to accommodate the competing interests in a prototypal
creditor/debtor situation. This insures the debtor a certain level of
protection, but significantly diminishes the protection he received
under Fuentes.2 In expanding the application of Mitchell, the Court
has eliminated a possible distinction on the basis of the kinds of
interests involved and has, notwithstanding the doubts expressed
by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, 3 given the states greater flex-
ibility in fashioning the form and timing of prejudgment remedies.
Many potential issues were not before the Court in Di-Chem.
Hence the decision does not precisely define what evidence would
justify issuance of the writ; presumably, evidentiary standards will
be formulated by the lower courts and state legislatures. Nor did the
Court state the form the post-writ hearing should take. Clearly the
creditor must bear the burden of proving the probable validity of his
claim; the question remains whether this should occur at a full scale
adversary hearing or a procedure limited to establishing the exist-
ence of a debt, default and the necessity for the writ. The Di-Chem
holding brings unanswered questions with its flexibility, and re-
mains to be developed as it is applied in subsequent cases.
R. Jeffrey Behm
71. 419 U.S. at 608.
72. The Di-Chem dissenters did not attack the Court's application of Mitchell, but were
disturbed by what they perceived as a revival of Fuentes. Id. at 614, 615-16 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 614.
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